The vote that ended the transition

The short version

The third quarter of 2026 was supposed to be the end of the Bangsamoro transition. Instead it became the beginning of a new political contest. On 14 September, 2.39 million voters elected the first regular parliament of the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao. Turnout was 84.34%, far above expectations. No party won a majority.

The election also formalised the split inside the Moro Islamic Liberation Front. The party of interim chief minister Abdulraof Macacua and the party of MILF chairman Murad Ebrahim finished almost level, with a third bloc holding the balance. The peace process survived the vote. The movement that made it possible did not survive intact.

The campaign

The campaign opened on 30 July with 631 candidates for 80 seats. It was the region's first experience of parliamentary politics: party lists, district contests, sectoral seats and a chief minister chosen by parliament rather than by voters.

The machinery was fragile. Comelec deployed 7,000 counting machines to 5,212 precincts, trained 20,000 teachers and promised results within hours. ANFREL and NDI trained observers and warned that voter education was the immediate priority, because most voters had never used a parliamentary ballot.

Violence never stopped. CCAA recorded 611 incidents and 235 deaths across BARMM from January to late July. The Palace attributed most to clan feuds rather than politics, but the distinction blurred as candidates hired private armed groups and rido overlapped with electoral rivalry. The gun ban took effect on 16 July; a town councilor was shot dead the same day.

The MILF split

The decisive political fact was the rupture inside the MILF. In 2025 Marcos appointed Macacua as interim chief minister without consulting the MILF Central Committee. Macacua then formed the Bangsamoro Federalist Party and removed Mohagher Iqbal as education minister, prompting the committee to suspend him as BIAF chief of staff in June.

On 3 September, eleven days before the vote, the Central Committee removed Macacua and 40 other BIAF officers from their command positions. Macacua kept his MILF membership but lost the armed wing. He campaigned as BFP chair; Murad's UBJP campaigned as the continuity candidate. The split turned a peace agreement between two parties into a three-way contest for the Bangsamoro inheritance.

The campaign was also dynastic. Murad's son ran for a district seat in the Special Geographic Area against a former MILF commander now with BFP. Several district races featured the same families that had dominated local politics for decades.

Election day

The vote was technically strong and physically dangerous. Turnout reached 84.34%, well above Comelec's 70-75% target, and 108 international observers monitored the process. In Maluso, Basilan, pre-shaded ballots were found in 36 precincts; Comelec replaced them and extended voting.

At least five people were killed and more than 20 wounded in Cotabato City and elsewhere around the vote. In some areas, observers reported controlled voting where clan structures and armed influence overlapped.

The result was a hung parliament: BFP 31 seats, UBJP 24 seats, the Bangsamoro Grand Coalition 8, and the remainder split among smaller parties and sectoral representatives. Both major camps fell short of the 41 needed to govern alone.

What the result means

The immediate consequence is coalition arithmetic. The BGC, with eight seats, became the kingmaker. A BFP-UBJP deal would keep the contest inside the Bangsamoro political class; a BFP-BGC deal would make Macacua chief minister and leave Murad's camp in opposition.

The deeper consequence is the fate of the peace agreement. The normalization track — decommissioning, reintegration, transitional justice and policing — is behind schedule and cannot be completed by the 30 October transition deadline. Only about 65% of combatants and 64% of weapons had been processed. Former fighters are ageing, under-supported and vulnerable to retaliation, and the government is only now considering a Colombia-style stipend.

A fractured MILF is the main risk to that track. Commander Bravo has warned of a return to armed struggle if the agreement is not honoured. The election gave both camps a stake in parliament, which helps. It also gave the losers a platform to challenge the process.

The violence after the vote

The election did not end the violence. In late September, a long-running MILF territorial dispute in Shariff Aguak displaced about 65 families, and a child was reportedly killed by a stray bullet. The incident confirmed the pattern analysts call "diffusing violence": the threat is no longer primarily jihadist terrorism but political, clan and patronage violence linked to unfinished normalization.

Jihadist groups remain active at a lower level. DI-Maute lost another leader in August, and the military killed several DI and BIFF commanders during the campaign. ISEAP has lost its province status and no longer receives central funding. But remnants still recruit children and marginalised youth, and the PNP is now tracking a new wave of leaderless online radicalisation among minors.

What the quarter settled

Three things became clear between July and September. The Bangsamoro electoral system works: it produced a credible, high-turnout vote under difficult conditions. The MILF is no longer a single actor, and its split will shape Bangsamoro politics for years. And the peace process has moved from a negotiation between two parties to a contest inside a fragmented political class.

The next tests were already scheduled: the chief minister vote at the end of the transition, the 2027 budget, and the remaining normalization milestones. The election was a milestone, not an ending.