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Armenia-Azerbaijan RelationsQuarterly article · Q3 2026

The peace dividend arrives before the peace

Armenia and Azerbaijan spent the third quarter building the trade, transport and institutional scaffolding of a settlement neither has signed, while Russia shifted from coercion to bargaining over the railway.

September 30, 2026 · 6 min read

The short version

The Armenia-Azerbaijan peace treaty was not signed in the third quarter of 2026. The quarter's most consequential developments were practical arrangements that assume one is coming: Armenia shipped its first exports to Azerbaijan,1 the sides agreed to restart border delimitation from the north,2 the TRIPP framework went to the Constitutional Court,3 and Yerevan adopted a 2026-2031 programme built around peace.4

The gap between the unsigned treaty and the rebuilding relationship is the quarter's defining feature. Baku's official position is that the conflict is over,5 while Yerevan is building facts on the ground that would make a treaty harder to reverse. Both sides are acting as if the politics will catch up.

A settlement built in advance

Pashinyan and Aliyev met in Bishkek on 31 August, their first leader-level contact since June's election.1 Mirzoyan said Armenian exports would begin "in the next few days", and by 24 September Armenia had shipped aluminium foil — its first-ever export to Azerbaijan.6 Until then trade had been one-way: Azerbaijan sold $17.4 million of goods, mostly petroleum, in January-July, while Armenian exports were zero.7 The volumes are modest, but they make trade two-way for the first time.

The transport file follows the same logic. The government approved the TRIPP framework bill on 16 July and sent it to the Constitutional Court; the law creates a development company holding a 49-year lease.3 Bayramov said in September that construction will not start until 2027.8

Armenia's Western turn becomes a programme

On 20 August Pashinyan declared the "Fourth Republic" and "Real Armenia" ideology, and on 24 August presented the 2026-2031 programme to parliament.4 The document drops the description of Russia as a "strategic alliance" in favour of a "transforming and deepening" partnership — what OC Media called a formal downgrade in diplomatic language.9 Its priorities are institutionalising peace with Azerbaijan, TRIPP, visa liberalisation with the EU, 6% annual growth and SCO membership.10

Pashinyan said Armenia would begin an EU application process. Zelenskyy endorsed the course, and a Russian Duma deputy warned that Armenia could not "sit on two chairs".11

Brussels moved in parallel. Von der Leyen's 2 July visit announced autonomous trade measures covering roughly 80% of Armenian exports, and the EU Council approved two-year duty-free access on 5 September.1213 The shift in trade geography predates the measures: Armenian exports to the EU rose more than 80% to $516 million in January-June, according to government data.14 The Council measure is temporary trade access, not a membership track.

Russia changes tools

Moscow spent the quarter cycling through instruments. Deputy Foreign Minister Mikhail Galuzin said on 11 August that Armenia must decide by December whether to hold a referendum on EU or EAEU membership.15 Rospotrebnadzor blocked the sale of 70,000 bottles of Armenian water and soft drinks.16 Russia outlined the Article 25 procedure for suspending Armenia's CSTO voting rights at a Moscow summit expected in November; the decision requires consensus.17

On 15 September Gazprom suspended gas supplies for ten days, calling it scheduled maintenance. Russia supplied about 82% of Armenia's gas imports in 2025.18 Then, on 21 September, Putin sent Pashinyan a congratulatory Independence Day note — his first public gesture since the election. Eurasianet read the greetings as a shift from coercion to a charm offensive after intimidation failed to move Pashinyan.19

The railway concession has become the main item of bargaining. At the same Bishkek summit, Pashinyan and Putin agreed to explore selling the South Caucasus Railway concession to a third party acceptable to both; Kazakhstan has been mentioned as a possible buyer, and MassisPost reported that Russia strongly opposes the idea.2021 Pashinyan has called Russia's 102nd military base "not vital" and confirmed a comprehensive "inventory" of relations covering transport and energy.22 In July, JAMnews reported that Russia had not signalled readiness to proceed with railway works but would not give up the concession.23

The corridor race

TRIPP is not the only corridor being built. Turkey and Azerbaijan have committed €2.4 billion to the Kars-Dilucu railway, which bypasses Armenia entirely, with construction planned for 2026-2030; TRIPP itself is put at around $400 million with no private operator named. Modern Diplomacy's base case, at 55%, is that the corridor outgrows the peace process and that Armenia ends up missing it rather than blocking it.24

Armenia's bet is different. The corridor's value is less about transit revenue than about lock-in: making the country too useful to the region's connectivity to be left out. That is a plausible strategy, but it depends on partners who have alternatives — and on the treaty that would make the route permanent.

Yerevan has ruled out any foreign military or security role. A Civil Contract MP said the framework keeps the border, customs and security under exclusive Armenian jurisdiction.25

What to watch

  • Whether the constitutional draft, finalised in August, is published and put to a referendum — and whether Pashinyan can win one without a two-thirds majority.26
  • Whether Aliyev's additional demands on enclaves and resettlement narrow or expand once a treaty text is formally on the table.
  • Whether the railway working group produces Russian investment or becomes a holding pattern.
  • Whether TRIPP's 2027 construction target holds, and whether the Kars-Dilucu bypass draws away the freight TRIPP needs.
  • Whether Russia returns to coercion as winter gas negotiations approach.

References

Footnotes

  1. OC Media, "Pashinyan and Aliyev meet amidst news of Armenian exports to Azerbaijan", 2026-09-01. https://oc-media.org/pashinyan-and-aliyev-meet-amidst-news-of-armenian-exports-to-azerbaijan/ ↩ ↩2

  2. Caucasus Watch, "Azerbaijan, Armenia Agree on Northern Start for Border Delimitation", 2026-09-09. https://caucasuswatch.de/en/news/azerbaijan-armenia-agree-on-northern-start-for-border-delimitation.html ↩

  3. JAMnews, "Armenia begins ratifying TRIPP agreement with US", 2026-07-16. https://jam-news.net/armenia-begins-ratifying-the-tripp-agreement/ ↩ ↩2

  4. Caucasus Watch, "Pashinyan Declares 'Fourth Republic' — Real Armenia ideology", 2026-08-25. https://caucasuswatch.de/en/news/pashinyan-declares-fourth-republic.html ↩ ↩2

  5. Caliber.Az, "Hajiyev says conflict is over, Azerbaijan moving towards lasting peace", 2026-09-11. https://caliber.az/en/post/official-azerbaijan-moving-towards-lasting-peace-with-armenia ↩

  6. OC Media, "Armenian and Azerbaijan agree to 'promote positive agenda' amid tension", 2026-09-25. https://oc-media.org/armenian-and-azerbaijan-agree-to-promote-positive-agenda-amid-tension/ ↩

  7. JAMnews, "Armenia-Azerbaijan exports could begin 'soon' — $17.4M trade data", 2026-08-21. https://jam-news.net/exports-from-armenia-to-azerbaijan/ ↩

  8. Mirror-Spectator, "Start Date for TRIPP Pushed Back to 2027", 2026-09-15. https://mirrorspectator.com/2026/09/15/start-date-for-tripp-connecting-armenia-and-azerbaijan-pushed-back ↩

  9. OC Media, "Armenia downgrades relations with Russia in new government programme", 2026-08-21. https://oc-media.org/armenia-downgrades-relations-with-russia-in-new-government-programme ↩

  10. Caucasus Watch, "Armenia Sets 2031 Goals for Peace, Diversification and Economic Growth", 2026-08-21. https://caucasuswatch.de/en/news/armenia-sets-2031-goals-for-peace-diversification-and-economic-growth.html ↩

  11. Caucasus Watch, "Zelenskyy Backs Armenia's European Course, Pashinyan Signals EU Membership Bid", 2026-08-27. https://caucasuswatch.de/en/news/zelenskyy-backs-armenias-european-course-pashinyan-signals-eu-membership-bid.html ↩

  12. Caucasus Watch, "Von der Leyen in Yerevan — EU Unveils Tariff-Free Trade Measures and Final €18M Tranche", 2026-07-03. https://caucasuswatch.de/en/news/von-der-leyen-in-yerevan-eu-unveils-tariff-free-trade-measures-and-final-eur18-million-tranche-for-armenia.html ↩

  13. Caucasus Watch, "EU Council Backs Two-Year Trade Boost for Armenian Exports", 2026-09-05. https://caucasuswatch.de/en/news/eu-council-backs-two-year-trade-boost-for-armenian-exports.html ↩

  14. ARKA, "Armenia's exports to the EU increased by over 80% in the first half of 2026", 2026-08-20. https://www.arka.am/en/news/economy/armenia-s-exports-to-the-eu-increased-by-over-80-in-the-first-half-of-2026 ↩

  15. Brussels Signal, "Russia presses Armenia to choose between the EU and the Eurasian Economic Union", 2026-08-18. https://brusselssignal.eu/2026/08/russia-presses-armenia-to-choose-between-the-eu-and-the-eurasian-economic-union ↩

  16. OC Media, "Russia bans import of 70,000 bottles of Armenian water and soft drinks", 2026-08-06. https://oc-media.org/russia-bans-import-of-70-000-bottles-of-armenian-water-and-soft-drinks/ ↩

  17. Caucasus Watch, "Russia Outlines Procedure for Suspending Armenia's CSTO Voting Rights", 2026-08-05. https://caucasuswatch.de/en/news/russia-outlines-procedure-for-suspending-armenias-csto-voting-rights.html ↩

  18. Eurasianet, "Russia turns off gas taps to Armenia", 2026-09-15. https://eurasianet.org/russia-turns-off-gas-taps-to-armenia ↩

  19. Eurasianet, "Kremlin switching gears with Armenia", 2026-09-22. https://eurasianet.org/kremlin-switching-gears-with-armenia ↩

  20. JAMnews, "What Pashinyan and Putin agreed in Bishkek amid peak tensions in relations", 2026-09-01. https://jam-news.net/pashinyan-putin-meeting-in-bishkek-2/ ↩

  21. MassisPost, "Armenia-Russia Relations After the Pashinyan-Putin Meeting", 2026-09-13. https://massispost.com/2026/09/armenia-russia-relations-after-the-pashinyan-putin-meeting/ ↩

  22. MassisPost, "Pashinyan — Armenia and Russia Reviewing Bilateral Relations as Yerevan Clarifies Position on CSTO and Russian Base", 2026-09-17. https://massispost.com/2026/09/pashinyan-armenia-and-russia-reviewing-bilateral-relations-as-yerevan-clarifies-position-on-csto-and-russian-base/ ↩

  23. JAMnews, "Armenia launches independent restoration of railway to Turkish and Azerbaijani borders", 2026-07-03. https://jam-news.net/armenia-launches-independent-restoration-of-railway-to-turkish-and-azerbaijani-borders/ ↩

  24. Modern Diplomacy, "The Middle Corridor's Real Winners Aren't Armenia and Azerbaijan", 2026-09-26. https://moderndiplomacy.eu/2026/09/26/armenia-azerbaijan-middle-corridor-tripp-peace-dividend-who-is-investing ↩

  25. Caucasus Watch, "Armenia Rules Out Foreign Security Role in TRIPP", 2026-08-17. https://caucasuswatch.de/en/news/armenia-rules-out-foreign-security-role-in-tripp.html ↩

  26. I•CONnect, "A Constitution at the Crossroads — Armenia's Reform Debate in a Shifting South Caucasus", 2026-08-14. https://www.iconnectblog.com/a-constitution-at-the-crossroads-armenias-reform-debate-in-a-shifting-south-caucasus ↩

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